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 use subInstitutionalperspectives of globalizationenvision thehomogenization
of theworld throughglobal cultural, economic, andpolitical dynamics,
while glocalization theory highlights how local cultures may adapt or
resist global forces. On the basis of these theories, the authors analyze
when, where, and why local hybrid organizational forms emerge as a
reaction to globalization.They suggest that the impact of globalization
on theemergenceandexpansionofhybridorganizational forms,which
reﬂect localadaptationsofglobal forms,dependsonthree typesofmod-
erators: (1) theﬁt between global and local ideas, values, andpractices;
(2) the experience of the local community with alternative organiza-
tional forms; and (3) the motivation of the local community to adapt.
The authors test their hypotheses with data from the high school ed-
ucation system in Turkey from 1985 to 2007, a period in which Tur-
key experienced the growing impact of globalization.INTRODUCTION
Globalization is often regarded as a formidable blending force, blurring
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeyandculturalhomogenization (RobertsonandKhonder1998).Althoughglob-
alization has a number of different dimensions and meanings, the diffusion
of cultural models and ideas is seen as a central feature (Meyer 2000; Kern
2010). Guillén (2001, p. 236), referring to Held et al. (1999, p. 16), deﬁnes
globalization as “a process fueled by, and resulting in, increasing cross-
border ﬂows of goods,money, information, and culture . . . leading to greater
interdependence andmutual awareness (reﬂexivity) among economic, polit-
ical, and social units in theworld, and among actors in general.”There seems
to be little dispute about the fact that “in many areas of social life, common
models organized in world discourse arise and penetrate social life world-
wide” (Meyer 2000, p. 234). At the same time, however, a paradox emerges
as this process goes hand in hand with the growing importance of the par-
ticularities of local communities in shaping local cultural adaptations (Mar-
quis and Battilana 2009).
In line with this paradox, more recent accounts of the globalization pro-
cess underscore the dialectical tension between the global and the local. In-
creasing global interdependence is not only a boundary-blurring force but
it might also demarcate boundaries between the global and the local more
sharply—for instance, when globalization represents a threat to local tra-
ditions (Marquis and Battilana 2009, p. 284). Clearly, globalization is a very
complex process involving the simultaneous operation of global blending
and local segregating forces. Globalization comes with a subtle interaction
of tendencies toward universalism and particularism (Robertson andKhon-
der 1998, p. 28), produces homogenization and heterogenization (Brady,
Beckﬁeld, and Zhao 2007, p. 317), and is associated with clashes, conﬂicts,
and tensions between Western and non-Western concepts of globalization
(Robertson and Khonder 1998, p. 29). The implication is that different ver-
sions of modernity might emerge depending on the speciﬁc interplay be-
tween the global and the local.
Given that globalization is an ideology, subject to local contestation by ac-
tors andmovements thatmake distinct claims aboutmodernization (Guillén
2001), an important question is to understand how andwhen global cultural
or cognitive models diffuse in local communities (Schneiberg and Clemens
2006; Marquis and Battilina 2009). There is a long tradition in institutional
theory that studies the impact of higher-order institutions on lower-level out-
comes (Schneiberg andClemens 2006; Scott 2008), includinghow the emerg-
ing global polity affects nation-states and organizations (e.g., Meyer et al.
1997; for a review, see Schneiberg and Clemens [2006]). An understudied is-
sue, however, is howglobalization affects the local emergence of neworgani-Istanbul Şehir University, Altunizade Mh. Kuşbakışı Cd. No: 27, 34662, Istanbul,
Turkey. E-mail: anildivarci@sehir.edu.tr
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Allzational forms or,more generally, how the coevolution of institutions andor-
ganizations affects institutional and social change (Haveman andRao 1997,
2006; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007; Schneiberg, King, and Smith 2008).
This is an important omission given that organizations are major carriers
of ideology, playing an important role in the diffusion of ideas and values.
Organization-building processes fuel ideological struggles and therefore are
importantmediatorsof societal change (Barnett andWoywode2004;Simons
and Ingram 2004; Haveman, Rao, and Paruchuri 2007).
We address this gap by building on globalization and institutional theory
to develop an organizational ecology of the founding process of hybrid or-
ganizational forms that combine the templates and values of different par-
ent forms. We focus on hybrid forms because most institutional change is
the result of the transposition, hybridization, and recombination ofmaterials
provided by existing institutions (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006; Have-
man and Rao 2006; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). Speciﬁcally, we argue
that globalization spurs the emergence of new hybrid organizational forms
as a way for local communities to adjust to environmental uncertainty and
episodic change (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Minkoff 2002; Haveman and
Rao 2006). By combining aspects of globalization with features of local tem-
plates, hybrid organizations embody alternative institutional practices that
allow actors in local communities to solve the potential tensions between the
global and the local (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). As globalization acts
as a boundary-blurring force triggering (partial) institutional convergence
across the globe, our baseline expectation is that globalization goes hand in
handwith the emergenceandexpansionof suchhybridorganizational forms.
However, we argue that local conditions play an important role in this
process. As the word “glocal” implies, the impact of globalization depends
on the interpenetration of global forces and local responses (Robertson and
Khonder 1998). We follow recent developments in institutional theory that
move away from envisioning the institutional environment as a geography-
independent organizational ﬁeld inwhichmimetic processes unfold that lead
to convergence (Schneiberg andClemens 2006;Marquis andBatillana 2009).
In contrast, to understand the emergence of alternative templates, multilevel
models are needed that theorize about how thehigher-order context interacts
with local conditions in shaping multiple outcomes (Schneiberg et al. 2008;
Boone andÖzcan2014).Herewe claim that the extent towhich globalization
spurs the emergence of hybrid organizational forms will depend on speciﬁc
place-bound features of local communities that affect the latter’s susceptibil-
ity to adapt to processes of globalization (Marquis and Battilana 2009).
Speciﬁcally, we propose that three different types of local-level modera-
tor conditions will block or ease the adaptation process. Thus these types of
conditions will affect whether or not universalism is blended with local par-
ticularism resulting in the proliferation of speciﬁc hybrid organizational1824
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeyforms (Marquis and Battilana 2009): (1) the resonance, or lack thereof, of
universal values with local traditions (local resistance; Kern 2010); (2) the
(non)availability of the parent form templates in local communities (local
templates; Minkoff 1994, 2002; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006; Schneiberg
2007); and (3) the absence or presence of local incentives that trigger mobi-
lizing forces to overcome the obstacles of hybrid form emergence (local in-
centives; Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005).
Thesemoderators are chosen as prior institutional research indicates that
they are likely to strongly affect the susceptibility of local communities to
adapt to globalization pressures. Indeed, related research on the adoption
and diffusion of ﬁeld-level contested innovations and institutional logics
does underscore the importance of the potential adopters’ incentives and
cultural ﬁt (Kennedy andFiss 2009; Ansari, Fiss, andZajac 2010; Fiss, Ken-
nedy, and Davis 2012). Similarly, mainly qualitative research reveals that
institutional change and the emergence of new templates are often consti-
tuted from building blocks of locally available existing institutions (Schnei-
berg and Clemens 2006).
Our empirical context is theTurkish high school system in the period from
1985 to 2007. Education is an appropriate setting as educational systems ex-
perience strong homogenizing pressures due to globalization (Meyer et al.
1997), whichGuillén (2001, p. 244) refers to as “theworldwide spread of con-
formism in educational systems.”Turkey is an interesting case studybecause
there is a strong tension between the global Western version of modernism
and local Islamic traditions, which is fueled by local religious polarization
and secular-Islamic contestation.2 A growing number of so-calledAnatolian
Imam Hatip schools can be regarded as a hybrid school form because they
combine the curricula of two other school forms: Anatolian and ImamHatip
high schools. The former can be identiﬁed as cosmopolitan high schools
whose educational curriculumembodies secularist andWestern-oriented val-
ues, while the latter are traditional religious high schools (Boone, Divarci,
and van Witteloostuijn 2011). Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools are reli-
gious high schools, which also provide aWestern type of education in foreign
languages. Because there is considerable geographic heterogeneity in Tur-
key, we can study how the interplay between universalism (the extent of
globalization at the national level) and different local (district-level) partic-
ularistic characteristics affects the founding rate of hybrid high schools (An-
atolian Imam Hatip high schools) at the local (district) level.2 Our references to “global” and “local” do not imply that the local is without any global
aspects. After all, Islam is a religion that operates globally and that has been and still is
very inﬂuential in a global context. Rather, for the sake of the argument, we use “global”
and “globalization” as deﬁned in much of the literature, with reference to Western cul-
tural, economic, and political orientations.
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AllOur key contribution is that we examine organizations as carriers of ide-
ologies related to globalization, emphasizing their important role in how
communities adapt to and affect institutional change. This important role
of organizations has been underemphasized in prior work in organizational
sociology (Haveman and Rao 2006). Consequently, we focus on the impact
of themacrolevel globalization process on themicrolevel emergence of orga-
nizational forms in a comparative context of different communities, empha-
sizing the role of local agency, interest, and resistance. Our study is a re-
sponse to the “plea . . . for a comparative sociology of globalization that is
sensitive to local variations and to how agency, interest, and resistance me-
diate the relationship between globalization causes and outcomes” (Guillén
2001, p. 235). This research is required as we lack “theoretical perspectives
that bridge themicro-macro gap, i.e., thatmoveacross levels of analysis from
the world system to the nation-state, the industry, sector, community, orga-
nization, andgroup. . . .We still know little about . . . its consequences on such
key sociological variables as organizational patterns” (p. 255).
We ﬁnd considerable support for the global-local interaction hypotheses
about the emergence of hybrid high schools in Turkey, which clearly un-
derscores the saliency of recent pleas of institutional theorists that dynamic
analyses of institutions and change require a focus on heterogeneity and the
emergence of alternative templates (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). Before
we present our context-speciﬁc hypotheses, we ﬁrst provide a rich descrip-
tion of the dynamics of the Turkish high school system in a country that has
experienced growing religious polarization together with a rising intercon-
nectedness with the world system.SEGREGATING AND BLENDING FORCES IN TURKEY
A Century of Religious Polarization in Turkey
Even though the ofﬁcial history of Turkey as a nation-state begins with the
foundation of the secular republic in 1923, with Mustafa Kemal Ataturk as
its ﬁrst president, the beginning of Turkish modernity can be traced back to
1839with the start of theTanzimat era (Kaya 2004).3 During this era, theOt-
toman intelligentsia began to question the reasons behind the superiority of
the West. This led to the emergence of new intellectual groups such as the
Young Ottomans, who established the ﬁrst constitutional regime in 1876.
This era already includes the traces of the Kemalist modernization project.
For example, secularism became an important topic of discussion in this pe-
riod (Kaya 2004). The Tanzimat era ended in 1878. Three decades later, the3 This can be translated as the “reforms” era.
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in TurkeyYoung Turks (a new group based on the ideas of the Young Ottomans) suc-
ceeded to establish the second constitutional regime by launching a military
coup in 1908 and formed the ﬁrst modern political party, İttihat Terakki.
Although the establishment of this second constitutional regime solved some
of the problems in society, it also paved the way for a tradition of military
coups in the history of the Turkish Republic (Kaya 2004). The reforms dur-
ing the Tanzimat period included transformations of many institutions, in-
cluding the education system. Although the transformed education system
was still centered on religion, the bureaucrats of the Tanzimat era also in-
cluded positive sciences in the curricula in addition to the religious courses,
in order to increase the quality of education (Somel 2001).
As amilitary ofﬁcer inﬂuenced by theYoungTurks, Ataturk tried to trans-
form the remains of the Ottoman Empire into a modern, Western-oriented
state, based on secular principles with reforms that, for example, uniﬁed ed-
ucation, abolished the Sharia, and introduced a modern Swiss-inspired civil
code after the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Gender equality
was formally recognized, andwomen obtained the right to vote and become
elected in parliament. These reforms were accompanied by several cultural
and symbolic measures such as the replacement of Arabic by Latin script
and theprohibition againstwearing a fez.TheKemalistmodernizationproj-
ect represented a major revolution in a basically conservative and tradi-
tional Islamic society. During the single-party era, however, there was no
room for competing ideas or for any platform to express social discontent
(Zürcher 2004). The interpretation of secularism in this era was not limited
to the separation of the state and religion, but also involved the removal of
religion from public life and control over religious institutions (Zürcher 2004).
Therefore, it is no surprise that religious opposition arose from the very be-
ginning (Zürcher 2004). In fact, the Kemalist reforms lie at the very origin
of the gradual rise of political Islam in the second half of the 20th century
(Sakallıoğlu 1996; Önis 1997; Güven 2005).
Military ofﬁcers and civilian bureaucrats—the major power holders in
the authoritarian state—imposed the westernization project unilaterally
during the single-party era in the republic’s history until 1946 (Sakallıoğlu
1996). Eventually, so much contention arose that the state had to allow par-
ties other than the Republican People’s Party into the political arena at the
end of World War II. The importance of the opposition is demonstrated by
the huge victory of the center-right Democratic Party (DP), which gained
53.4% of the votes in the 1950 elections—a party that claimed to represent
the periphery against the secular, bureaucratic intelligentsia. One of the ﬁrst
actions of the new government was to relax the dominance of secularism
that had been a feature of the single-party era (Zürcher 2004). The govern-
ment introduced voluntary religious courses into primary schools, restored1827
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Allthe Arabic instead of the Turkish call to prayer, and established Imam
Hatip (i.e., preacher) schools and a faculty of divinity at Ankara University.
For the secularists who had internalized Kemalist principles—such as civil
servants, academics, and military ofﬁcers—this relaxation was a threat to
their cultural and political hegemony (Zürcher 2004).
The DP government ended in 1960 with a military coup. The Turkish
army has always considered itself the guardian of Kemalist principles and
was uncomfortable with the DP’s policies. The DP was closed down and
banned from politics. After the army handed over power to a newly elected
government in 1961, a period of liberalization followed. The 1960s were a
decade in which ideologies clashed and became a matter of public debate
(Landau 1997). In 1970, the National Order Party (NOP), the ﬁrst pro-Islamic
party of theTurkishRepublic, was founded. Even thoughNOP’s party pro-
gram emphasized democratic values, the party ﬁrmly stood for freedom of
religion and Islamic education. As the party also rejected any type of secu-
larism that could be perceived as being hostile toward Islam (Landau 1997),
it offered a voice to religious and conservative people (Güven 2005). How-
ever, the NOP was banned in 1971 because it violated the secularist princi-
ples of theTurkishConstitution.The role of religion in public lifewas not the
only source of polarization in Turkey during the 1970s. Economic recessions
led to social unrest, and different factions at both the extreme left and right
emerged to ﬁght for the control of the streets and campuses (Zürcher 2004).
To end this state of chaos, the military took over again in 1971.
After the military intervention of 1971, successive governments failed to
solve Turkey’s economic and political problems.Many political parties and
socialmovements emerged representing various ideologies, ranging from ex-
treme left to extreme right, including religious sects andKurdish separatists.
Most of these groups strongly opposed the repressive Kemalist ideology.
These developments expanded the boundaries of pluralism in Turkish soci-
ety and generated polarization along ideological lines. The end result was
escalating violence and a new military coup in 1980 (Pak 2004). Although
one of the aims of the military leaders of the 1980 coup was to defend the
Kemalist principles, this time the underlyingmotivationwas quite different.
The leaders “deﬁned the causes of the socio-political problems as a lack of
religious dignity and the domination of a left-wing discourse in society”
(Güven 2005, p. 198). They realized that the Kemalist ideology did not reso-
nate well among the majority of the Turkish population and that religion
could be used as a unifying power against the fragmentation and contesta-
tion caused by the rise of leftists, socialists, radical religious sects, ultrana-
tionalists, and Kurdish separatists (Ahmad 1991; Salt 1995; Pak 2004).
The aim was to create a more homogeneous and less political Islamic com-
munity (Yavuz 1997). Consequently, the military government made tactical
concessions to religious interests not only to secure their support but also to1828
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeygain ofﬁcial control over religious issues, including the role of religion in ed-
ucation.
This action contributed to the rise of political Islam and the development
of anew ideological concept, the “Turkish Islamic synthesis,”whichwascon-
structedbyagroupof conservative scholars (Yavuz1997;Güven2005).This
ideology, supported by the center-rightMotherland Party representing a di-
verse electorate, attempted toassimilate Islamicgroupsandnationalists.The
aim was to integrate Islamic symbols with nationalism and, by so doing, to
create a more homogeneous and less political Islamic society and to avoid
the inﬂuence of left-wing ideologies (Rabasa and Larrabee 2008). The in-
ﬂuence of religion in public life strongly increased as a result of these devel-
opments. The rise of political Islam eventually culminated in the victory of
the Islamic Welfare Party in the 1995 elections and the appointment of the
ﬁrst Islamic prime minister (Necmettin Erbakan) of the Turkish Republic.
The result of the election “revealed a society sharply divided along secular
versus Islamist sociocultural lines” (Yavuz 1997, p. 63).
Since the 1990s, the relationship between politics and religion has become
an increasingly important issue inTurkish society as a result of the rise of Is-
lam—politically, economically,andculturally (Keyman2007).Politically, re-
ligionbecamepoliticized through the rise topowerof Islam-inspiredpolitical
parties. Economically, “Anatolian tigers” emerged, aswitnessedby the foun-
dation ofMUSIAD (Independent Industrialists’ andBusinessmen’s Associ-
ation), a business association of religiously conservative businessmen from
Anatolia that aims to combine free-marketpractices and traditional religious
values.4 Culturally, the demands of the religious sects increased, symbolized
bytheplea tohaveheadscarvesaccepted inpublicorganizationsorat theuni-
versities (Keyman 2007). However, the growing antisecular rhetoric and ac-
tivities of those in power disappointed and agitated secular public opinion.
This resulted in an escalation of the tension and antagonism between both
factions (Heper and Güney 2000; Güven 2005). For secularists, defying
Kemalist principles is a threat fordemocracy, culture, and the republic,while
theIslamicoppositionwants to “de-Kemalize” culture and in order to obtain
freedom of expression of religion in public life (Aydın and Çolak 2004). The
politicization of Islam, in turn, further triggered the fear of secularists about
the manifestation of religion in public life (Aydın and Çolak 2004). This is
demonstrated by the establishment of several movement and countermove-
ment organizations in this era, leading to increasing polarization, dividing
Turkey into two dominant factions (underpinned by many smaller ones)
that are clearly distinct: a secular and a religious one.4 The term “Anatolian tigers” refers to a number of cities in Turkey that have displayed
impressive growth since the 1980s.
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Ever since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the country has been go-
ing througheconomicandsocial changes thatoriginally tookroot in thewest-
ernizationmovementofOttomansociety in the19thcentury.However, these
changes have brought along their own internal conﬂicts (Çarkoğlu andTop-
rak 2007). Speciﬁcally, this process of change created conﬂict between the
supporters of Western-style modernization and the countermovements re-
actingagainst suchwesternization.Moreover, eventhoughTurkishmodern-
ization has been a project of the state since the foundation of the Turkish
Republic, the integration of the Turkish economy into the global market-
place began only in the 1980s with economic liberalization (Keyman and
Koyuncu 2005).
Turgut Ozal, the nineteenth prime minister of Turkey and one of the ar-
chitects of the Turkish Islamic synthesis, introduced a series of transforma-
tive policies paving the way for economic liberalization, as well as the rees-
tablishment of parliamentary democracy after the 1980 military coup. The
aim of the economic policies of this period was to shift from a protectionist
and import-substitution approach to a liberal and market-oriented strategy
instead (Harrison, Rutherford, and Tarr 1993). The reason behind this rad-
ical shift was the fact that the Turkish economy had been suffering from
structural constraints to growth for some years. The solution introduced by
the liberal government was the integration of the Turkish economy into
the world capitalist system (Ardiç 2009). This integration process was not
only initiated by government policies but also stimulated through structural
adjustment programs organized by the International Monetary Fund and
the World Bank (Cizre and Yeldan 2005). As a result of the liberalization
policies, Turkey developed economic relationships with several countries
and gained access to a range of export markets. However, rapid economic
development required large capital imports because domestic savings were
insufﬁcient for the required investment. In this period, foreign investors
were attracted by Turkey’s great economic potential and increasingly lib-
eral economic policies; as a result, the amount of foreign capital invested
in Turkey increased rapidly (Ardıç 2009).
The globalization process that took off with Turkey’s integration into
global capitalism also had political and social consequences. First, the eco-
nomic international relations of Turkey improved through increasing trade
and foreign direct investment. Second, as a consequence of economic devel-
opment andadvanced communication technologies, global connectivity and
global consciousness increased. The most prominent reﬂections of global
culture in Turkey can be seen in the patterns of consumption and in the life-
style of its inhabitants (Helvacioglu 2000). The global cultural ideas andprac-
tices began to spread bymeans ofmassmedia. Globalization acted as a blend-1830
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeying forcebyblurring thedistinctions betweenTurkey and the rest of theworld,
increasing the interconnectedness of the country with global norms, values,
and practices.
The impact of globalization on theTurkish society is illustrated inﬁgure 1,
which plots the KOF (Konjunkturforschungsstelle) globalization index for
Turkey for the period 1970–2007 (on a scale of 1–100 each year, with higher
numbers indicating more globalization). This index was ﬁrst presented in
2002 (Dreher 2006) and measures the extent of globalization of a country
along three dimensions: economic, political, and social. It is well suited for
our purpose as it closely matches recent deﬁnitions of globalization, that is,
the extent of global interconnectedness of a country among economic, polit-
ical, and social units (Guillén 2001). Subsequent empirical work has shown
that the KOF index is a valid measure of a country’s extent of globalization
(see the methods section for a discussion). The KOF index covers 123 coun-
tries and includes 23 variables, underscoring the fact that globalization is a
multifaceted concept. The data were obtained from the website of the Swiss
Economic Institute (http://www.kof.ethz.ch/).
Figure 1 illustrates that globalization started to accelerate in Turkey
around 1985 (see also Cizre and Yeldan 2005). All KOF indices rapidly in-
creased until 1994 and subsequently continued to grow incrementally until
the end of the period, by and large, revealing the inﬂuential impact of the
globalization wave.
The rise of political Islam together with increasing globalization and the
implementation of neoliberal policies led to the emergence of an alternative,
non-Western modernity—a religious/modern synthesis—espoused by the so-
called new “devout bourgeois class” (Demir, Acar, and Toprak 2004). As a
consequence of neoliberal economic policies starting in the “Ozal period,”
many religiously conservative cities, suchasDenizli,Konya, andKayseri, ex-FIG. 1.—KOF globalization index and its three dimensions for Turkey, 1970–20071831
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Allperiencedrapideconomicgrowthanddevelopment.By improving theirbusi-
ness practices, small and medium-sized enterprises in those cities prospered
and formednewbusiness communities (Demir et al. 2004). Economic liberal-
ization strongly increased economic productivity and capital accumulation
in Anatolia. The emergence of the Anatolian tigers contributed to thewealth
of the relatively religious and conservative faction that resides in Anatolia.
These developments made it clear to more conservative and religious
people that globalization, economic growth, and Islam are not necessarily
contradictory, but can be synthesized instead (Özbudun and Keyman 2002).
Indeed, the religious faction started to criticize “the status of the secular-
rational thinking as the exclusive source of modernity in Turkey” (Keyman
andKoyuncu2005,p.110).Thedevoutbourgeoisclassusedmodernmethods
of business and demanded more political freedom yet wanted to realize this
without losing its religious identity (Demir et al. 2004). The emergence of this
new class was also reﬂected institutionally in the emergence of new school
forms,businessassociations,andsocialmovements.Someof theprominent ex-
amples are the diffusion of Islamic banks (interest-free banking) and the
emergence of MUSIAD. These developments fueled the tension between
the secular elites, who embracedWestern modernity, and the new rising elite
class striving for a religious/modern synthesis.Implications for the Turkish High School System
Given that high schools are the cradle for future elites, religious contention
and the rising tension between different forms of modernism had an enor-
mous impact on the dynamics of the Turkish high school system. As educa-
tion is an extremely important vehicle for the diffusion of values and ideol-
ogies in societies (Nielsen and Hannan 1977), the educational system was
and remains a major battleﬁeld (see Güven 2005), where all these tensions
materialize via the establishment of different school types that carry these
different ideologies.
Traditionally, there are three types of high schools that prepare students
for higher education inTurkey: regular high schools, Anatolian high schools
(both secular), and Imam Hatip high schools.5 Regular high schools are the
dominant type inTurkey.Theseare thebasichigh schools thatdonot require
any entrance exam. Anatolian high schools admit their students on the basis
of the nationwide high school entrance score, and they provide education
in foreign languages. In addition, Anatolian high schools provide higher-There are also private high schools in Turkey. However, in this article, we focus on the
ublic high schools that do not require any tuition. Private schools constituted a meager
% of all high schools in Turkey as of 2007 (National Education Statistics, published by5
p
1
the Turkish Ministry of National Education).
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeyquality education than the other two types, and their curriculum embodies
secularist andWestern-orientedvalues.TheﬁrstAnatolianhighschoolswere
established by the government in 1955 as alternatives to international (e.g.,
French,German, or Italian) high schools that provided high-quality and for-
eign language education in Turkey.6 In the meantime, as the impact of glob-
alization intensiﬁed, these schools became more and more popular among
the secular faction mainly because these schools do not force any type of re-
ligion on the students and at the same time provide high-quality education
including foreign languages—both seen as a ﬁrst step for a student to be-
come connected to the rest of the world.
On the other side of the ideological spectrum, Imam Hatip high schools
provide religious education. Although the aim of Ataturk was to provide
one uniﬁed, secular educational system, one of the major strategies of the Is-
lamic movement was the creation of a counterelite by gradually strengthen-
ing the Islamic stream in the educational system (Güven 2005).7 As a result,
during the 20th century, the number of ImamHatip high schools expanded
so much that duality in education became a fact (Güven 2005). Depending
on the ruling government’s views, the ImamHatip schools went through sev-
eral changes over time.While some governments saw them as a threat to sec-
ularism and therefore tookmeasures toweaken them, others viewed themas
a tool to stimulate Islamicdiscourseandhence tookmeasures todevelop them
further (Özgür 2012). Even though ImamHatip high schools were originally
founded to educate imams and preachers, because of the resurgence of Islam
during the 1950s and after a series of regulatory changes (Pak 2004), Imam
Hatip high schools have become regular educational institutions, preparing
students for higher education.8
The main characteristic of Imam Hatip high schools is that they provide
vocational courses as well as standard arts and science classes. Secularists
perceived the expansion of both the mission and number of Imam Hatip6 The state was suspicious that students of foreign schools would be inﬂuenced too much
by foreign values and would be insufﬁciently aware of their own history and culture.
Therefore, the Turkish state decided to establish its own cosmopolitan schools.
7 Ataturk’s aim was to keep religion and religious activities under the control of the sec-
ular state; this strategy also extended to the educational system. The Ottoman Empire
had a multiplicity of schools, which all had a religious component in their curriculum
(Somel 2001). After the foundation of the Turkish Republic, with the Uniﬁcation of Ed-
ucation Law in 1924, all educational institutions in Turkey became controlled by the
state (Özgür 2012).
8 The roots of Imam Hatip high schools can be traced back to the madrassas in the Ot-
toman Empire. Many of the madrassas also went through transformations, particularly
during the late Ottoman period, because of the erosion of their qualities and increasing
relations with the West. In this sense, already in the Ottoman Empire Imam Hatip high
schools had hybrid features combining religious education with regular Western-oriented
high school education.
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Allhigh schools as a threat, because a growing number of young people were
not educated to become an imamor a preacher, but instead “potential agents
of Islamic traditionalism and a potential source of votes for traditional-
fundamentalist politicians” (Sezer 1993, pp. 23–24). Indeed, the graduates
of ImamHatiphigh schools gradually entered elite functions inmany sectors
of Turkish society (Dorian 1997). As might be expected, Imam Hatip high
schools arepopularamongreligiousparentswhowant their children tobe re-
ligiously educated in addition to receiving standard schooling, while Anato-
lian high schools are preferred by parents who want their children to be ed-
ucated in line with secular/cosmopolitan norms (Pak 2004).
In 1985, a new school form emerged in theTurkish education system: An-
atolian Imam Hatip high schools—a combination of the curriculum of the
Anatolian high schools with that of the Imam Hatip–inspired religious ed-
ucation (Pak 2004). As a result, Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools can be
seen as a hybrid school form. The Imam Hatip high schools include sub-
stantial religious education in addition to the standard arts and science clas-
ses while they provide scant English-language training. For the newly
emerged devout bourgeois class, the question was which type of education
they wanted their children to have. Because of the intensiﬁcation of globali-
zation, ImamHatip high schools lost their attractiveness to religious parents
because these schools could not accommodate the upcoming global values,
norms, and practices. The new hybrid high school form offered a solution
by including religious education along with the high-quality foreign lan-
guage education essential in allowing their graduates to connect with the rest
of theworld.Yet, unlike Anatolian high schools, the curriculumofAnatolian
Imam Hatip high schools includes courses such as Arabic, theology, and
holy Qur’an as well as standard courses like mathematics and natural sci-
ences (TurkishMinistry of Education, General Directorate of Religious Ed-
ucation). In parallel to the changes in the world and in Turkish society, con-
servative and religious parents preferred their children be educated in
modern schools that taught foreign languages, had computer labs, and of-
fered sports facilities (Gökaçtı 2005). For these parents, having their chil-
dren learn to speak at least one foreign language, acquire the knowledge
necessary to use up-to-date technology, and become aware of what is going
on in the world were important, next to religious knowledge (Gökaçtı 2005).
Together with the intensiﬁcation of the impact of globalization, the num-
ber of Anatolian ImamHatip high schools increased rapidly. Figures 2 and
3 provide the relative densities of the different school forms. As can be seen
from the ﬁgures, the dominant high school type inTurkey is the regular high
school. In 2007, 55% of all public high schools were regular high schools,
but this percentage had dropped dramatically from 72% in 1985. In the ex-
panding periphery of the regular high school system, the prominent school
types include Anatolian (5% in 1985 and 25% in 2007), ImamHatip (23% in1834
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkey1985 and 14% in 2007), and Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools (only one
school in 1985 and 6% in 2007). The relative importance of both Anatolian
and Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools substantially increased over time
(also demonstrated by their growing densities; see ﬁg. 2), at the expense of
the dominant regular high schools and the traditional Imam Hatip high
schools (for which growth seems to stagnate). Figure 3 exhibits the growing
popularity of Anatolian ImamHatip high schools among the religious faction.
What makes the Turkish high school system highly appropriate for our
purposes is that the growth of the density of Anatolian Imam Hatip high
schools varies widely across localities in Turkey, deﬁned as districts. Hence,
below, we develop hypotheses thatmay explain this geographical variation,
both inandover time.That is,we formulatehypotheses speciﬁc for theTurk-FIG. 2.—The density of regular high schools, 1985–2007FIG. 3.—The density of ImamHatip, Anatolian, and hybrid high schools, 1985–20071835
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Allish high school context, focusing on the district-level founding rate of hybrid
Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools as our dependent variable.THE EMERGENCE OF HYBRID HIGH SCHOOLS
Globalization Push
The boundaries of different organizational forms are determined by the bal-
ance between segregating and blending mechanisms because continuity
among organizational populations depends on the relative strength of both
opposing forces (HannanandFreeman1989, p. 60).While segregatingmech-
anisms separate organizations into distinct forms by reifying differences,
blending mechanisms blur distinctions between organizational forms by re-
ifying similarities (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Haveman and Rao 2006). If
blending mechanisms are strong, distinctions among forms are relatively arbi-
traryandeasily bridged.Thus, opportunities forhybridorganizational forms
are created that combine the institutional logic materialized in two or more
organizational forms (Hannan and Freeman 1989; Haveman and Rao 2006).
According to institutional theory, globalization acts as a blending force
by spreading cosmopolitan values, practices, and institutions through iso-
morphic processes (Meyer et al. 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999; Schneiberg
andClemens 2006). States derivemuch of their structure and authority from
being embedded in a global world, which consists of common legitimating
models. Meyer et al. (1997, p. 169) argued that “instead of a central actor,
the culture ofworld societyallocates responsible andauthoritative actorhood
to nation-states.” Therefore, globalization provides the necessary templates
for nation-states and hence affects the evolution of organizational forms. Fol-
lowing this argument, we propose that globalization spurs local communi-
ties to adapt by adopting hybrid organizational forms.
Despite the pressure for global convergence of education systems (Meyer
andHannan 1979;Meyer, Bromley, andRamirez 2010), schools are still one
of the most important vehicles for nation building and the reproduction of
national ideologies (Nielsen and Hannan 1977; Saito 2011). Subsequently,
nation-states face a dilemma in terms of which institutional logic to adopt,
that is, the global or the local. The resolution for this contradiction often re-
sides in adapting the existing institutional arrangements by blending dif-
ferent institutional logics (Marquis andBattilana 2009). Oneway is to adopt
particular features from the global organizational form and to blend these
with the existing local ones. By building hybrid school forms, local commu-
nities avoid radical institutional change and gradually adapt to the global-
ization of the school system (Haveman and Rao 2006; Saito 2011).
In the slipstreamofTurkey’s accelerating integration in the globalmarket
economy in the 1980s (Cizre and Yeldan 2005), global norms, values, and1836
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeypractices began to spread to all spheres of life, including the education system
(Meyer et al. 1997). As a result of these developments, the traditional educa-
tion provided by Imam Hatip high schools began to fall short. Particularly,
the newly emerging devout bourgeois class realized that education not only
serves to diffuse and strengthen religious norms but should also prepare their
children to acquire the necessary competencies and skills to become world
citizens (Saito2011). Inorder tobepartof the futureelite inaglobalizingworld,
standard education combined with religious education does not sufﬁce any-
moreas theoppositional secular elite enjoinshigh-qualityeducation—adapted
to globalization practices—at Anatolian high schools.
These developments increased demand for hybrid schooling in Turkey
(high-quality cosmopolitan education embedded in Islamic traditions) and
triggered the establishment of Anatolian ImamHatip high schools. This de-
mand is met in two ways. First, the Turkish Ministry of Education, which
is responsible for top-down decisions about the location, number, and type
of high schools to be established in the different districts, takes into account
the needs of local communities. Second, bottom-up, the local community can
request a certain type of school in their district by making a demand to the
corresponding governor, who in turn transmits this request to the Ministry
ofEducation.Moreover, if the local community donates the necessary build-
ings and equipment to the state for a new school, then the government gives
permission for the founding of the school and assigns teaching staff. As a re-
sult, the founding process of high schools in Turkey is both a top-down and
a bottom-up process, implying that both local conditions and local collective
actions are important drivers of new school formation.9
HYPOTHESIS 1.—The district-level founding rate of hybrid high schools
(Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools) increases with globalization.Local Resistance
The globalization process in Turkey takes place in a society that historically
has strong traditional and conservative Islamic roots. The perception and
practice of religion, however, are not homogeneously distributed acrossTur-
key. In someregions, thedevoutbourgeoisiebecamean importantnewsocial
class (e.g., in Anatolia); in other regions, there are still many Islamic factions
that stronglyopposeWestern-typemodernity.Theseculturaland ideological
differences between localities affect how people react to forces of globaliza-
tion and, hence, the extent to which hybrid school forms will emerge (Mar-
quis and Battilana 2009). Kern (2010) argues that adaptation to global prac-
tices requires cultural resonance.Thenglobal institutions, values, andnorms9 For the principles of school foundings, we refer to http://www.meb.gov.tr/duyurular
/duyurular2010/mub/kurum_acilmasina_iliskin_esaslar.pdf.
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Allare regarded as persuasive ideas because they are compatible with existing
ones or provide answers and solutions to individual problems and will be
translated to ﬁt locally available principles and practices (Gamson 1992;
Campbell 2004; Kern 2010).
However, when globalization represents a threat to local traditions, itmay
demarcate boundaries between the global and the local more sharply (Mar-
quis and Battilana 2009, p. 284). Then westernization clashes with the local,
triggering resistance and spurring ideological contestation and segregation.
In the present context, in districts where Islamic traditionalism has a strong
foothold (as witnessed by voting for the most religious parties),10 resistance
against globalization has traditionally been very high. It can therefore be
predicted that in these districts demand for hybrid education will be ex-
tremely low even with strong globalization pressure. When religious tradi-
tionalism is low, in contrast, people will welcome hybrid solutions as a re-
sponse to globalization.
This reasoning is consistent with research in other settings that show that
ideological clashes have had a profound impact on the dynamics of several
industries (Boone andÖzcan 2014). For instance, anticorporate movements
in theUnitedStates,whichdefend the community logic againstmass-market
consolidation, have prevented the opening ofWal-Mart stores in some com-
munities (Ingram and Rao 2004; Rao, Yue, and Ingram 2011). In a similar
vein, local cultural resistancehampered thegrowthofmass-market commer-
cial banks in the United States in the 20th century (Marquis and Lounsbury
2007; Marquis and Huang 2009). Apparently, communities seem to adopt
dominant institutional templates onlywhencultural resistance is low.Taken
together, we therefore expect that the proportion of votes on the most reli-
gious parties will negatively moderate the impact of globalization on the
emergence of Anatolian ImamHatip high schools.
HYPOTHESIS 2.—The positive impact of globalization on the district-level
founding rate of hybrid high schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools)
decreases with the proportion of votes on the most religious parties in a local
community.Local Templates
Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools not only blend the curricula of Imam
Hatip andAnatolian high schools into hybrid education but also blend their
names literally as Anatolian ImamHatip high schools. In districts in which
both parent forms are ﬁrmly established, local people will not be unfamiliar
with the recombination implied by the newly emerging hybrid form. Ac-The “most religious parties” category does not refer to militant Islamist groups, but in-10stead to the legal political parties that voice a religious rhetoric.
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeycording to institutional theory, the presence of both parent forms in a dis-
trict should facilitate institutional recombination, and hence the emergence
of hybrid high schools, for twomain reasons (Oliver andMontgomery 2000;
Minkoff 2002; Haveman and Rao 2006; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006;
Schneiberg 2007).
First, the presence of parent form high schools in a local district provides
the necessary variation in organizational templates for hybrid organiza-
tional forms to emerge (Minkoff 2002; Haveman and Rao 2006). Organiza-
tional variation is the rawmaterial for institutional recombination, which is
the main feature of hybrid forms. In a similar vein, established institutional
paths represent the stock of resources and opportunities in local communi-
ties for transformation and for the development of alternative organizational
forms (Schneiberg 2007). For instance, experience with different organiza-
tional forms in local communities is a resource for institutional recombination
or redeployment.Existing organizational forms constrain and enablemobili-
zation and shape the capacity of neworganizational forms toproduce change
(Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008).
Second, as hybrid forms blend population boundaries, they face obstacles
to build up legitimacy and obtain resources (Minkoff 2002). However, newly
emerging organizational forms tend to beneﬁt from the legitimacy of estab-
lished organizations if they fall into a cognitive category that is easily recog-
nizable by the relevant audiences (Dobrev, Özdemir, and Teo 2006). In this
sense, the relationship between established and newly emerging organiza-
tional forms, which are differentiated by some aspects in comparison to the
established forms, as is the case for hybrid organizational forms,may bemu-
tualistic (Dobrev et al. 2006). Because of such legitimation spillovers, we
therefore expect that the local hybrid school founding rate will increase with
globalization especially when the local prevalence (i.e., density) of both par-
ent forms is high (i.e., ImamHatip high schools and Anatolian high schools;
Minkoff 1994, 2002), suggesting an interaction of local templates with glob-
alization. That is, the positive impact of globalization is ampliﬁed in a com-
munity with higher densities of both parent forms.
HYPOTHESIS 3.—The positive impact of globalization on the district-level
foundingrateofhybridhighschools (AnatolianImamHatiphighschools) in-
creases with the density of both parent school forms (Anatolian high schools
and ImamHatip high schools) in a local community.Local Incentives
Organizations that conform to established categories are easier for audiences
to recognize and to identify with, enhancing their legitimacy (Hannan and
Freeman 1989; Hannan, Pólos, andCarroll 2007). Because hybrid organiza-
tions blur the boundaries of taken-for-granted organizational forms, bound-1839
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Allary spanning generally meets sharp punishment as it has low appeal among
audiences (Rao, Monin, and Durand 2005; Hsu, Hannan, and Koçak 2009;
Hannan 2010; Kovács andHannan 2010). Particularly, the punishment gets
stronger if the category codes are oppositional or involve moral impera-
tives (KovácsandHannan2010).Inthissense,buildinghybridorganizational
forms andmarshaling their acceptance require strongmotivation of actors in
order togain local commitment andmobilize thenecessary resources (Benson
1977).Weargue that two types of incentivesmay serve asmobilizingmotiva-
tional forces: economic and ideological incentives (Boone and Özcan 2014).
First, local communities are more likely to adjust to globalization when
economic incentives to do so are high. Particularly, we claim that the degree
of resonance between global and local norms, values, and practices will be
highwhen the local community has a strong entrepreneurial culture, as wit-
nessed by the growth in the number of entrepreneurs. We predict that glob-
alization will spur the adoption of alternative modernities—that unify Is-
lamic traditions with features of Western modernism as reﬂected in hybrid
schools—in entrepreneurial districts. Beingpart of a globalworld (economic)
system is instrumental for entrepreneurs as a precondition for the accumula-
tion of capital and wealth. Local entrepreneurs have to operate in a market-
place that is modeled along the lines of practices spread through economic
globalization. They are therefore likely to bridge the gap between the local
and global world of economic capitalism.
Bythenatureof theirrole,entrepreneursareeconomicallymotivated.They
run a business that has to make a proﬁt to be sustainable (Kirzner 1997). As
Shane and Venkataraman (2000) point out, opportunity recognition is a key
attribute of entrepreneurship.Andafter an entrepreneur has observedanop-
portunity for a proﬁtable business, she or hewill seek to reap this opportunity
(Eckhardt and Shane 2003). In the context of globalization, we argue that lo-
cal entrepreneurs spot business opportunities resulting from being linked to
this global economic world and hence seek to promote the development of
conditions and competencies required to capture these opportunities. From
this perspective, religious entrepreneurial communities can beneﬁt greatly
from Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools, which teach the knowledge and
skills required for operating in the global business world—an illustrative ex-
ample being proﬁciency in English, the world’s lingua franca.
HYPOTHESIS 4.—The positive impact of globalization on the district-level
foundingrateofhybridhighschools (AnatolianImamHatiphighschools) in-
creaseswith the growth of the number of entrepreneurs in a local community.
Second, ideological polarization is another mobilizing force (Kurzman
1998; Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005; Boone and Özcan 2014), because rivalry
between dissimilar ideologies makes ideologies extremely sharp and salient,
which mobilizes the adherents of these ideologies to diffuse their values and1840
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeypreferences (Olzak andWest 1991;Barnett andWoywode 2004; Simons and
Ingram 2004). This is consistent with Meyer and Staggenborg’s (1996,
p. 1638) proposition that “when movements effectively create or exploit
events, they are likely to encourage countermovement mobilization at the
same time that they advance their own causes.”The salience argument con-
tends that ideological rivalry “galvanizes” the opposing groups and so spurs
the formation of formal organizations that carry these ideological values
(Olzak and West, 1991, p. 459). Such organization building mobilizes even
more collective action (Tilly 1978) such that the establishment of one organi-
zational formwill reinforce the dynamics of the rival one (Boone et al. 2011).
As carriers of ideologies, schools are affected by the distribution of differ-
ent ideologies in society. Each subgroup representing these ideologies de-
mands a speciﬁc form of schooling that ﬁts with its ideology. In addition,
schools have strategic importance for decision makers, since education is a
state instrument to inﬂuence the relationship of the individual to the state or
polity (Nielsen and Hannan 1977). So the demand for and supply of speciﬁc
types of schooling are driven by the prevailing ideologies in society and pri-
vate actors trying to inﬂuence political elites via social movements in order to
obtain schooling that ﬁts with their ideology (Meyer and Staggenborg 1996;
Güven 2005).
In Turkey, the century-long ideological/religious polarization mobilized
the participants of each faction to create structural arrangements against
each other in order to compete (Benson 1977). The number of Imam Hatip
high schools increased particularly in the 1950s in Turkey because of the in-
creasing inﬂuence of political Islam. At the same time, this triggered action
from secular countermovements with a strong demand for educational ex-
pansion of the secular/cosmopolitan high school type (Heper and Güney
2000; Güven 2005). Therefore, both forms stimulated each other’s growth
rate as a result of a sequence of movements and countermovements (Boone
et al. 2011).
With the emergence of a devout bourgeois class, cosmopolitan education
gained strategic importance for the religious population as well. In order to
be connectedwith the rest of theworld and to be a part of the elite as a global
actor (Meyer 2000), religious education had to compete on similar grounds
with the secular/cosmopolitan high schools by establishing hybrid school
forms. So, with the increasing impact of globalization, the nature of compe-
tition between secular and religious factions gained a new dimension: the
need toadapt toglobalnorms,values, andpractices. Ideological/religiouspo-
larization acts as a mobilizing force for the religious faction to reach out for
an alternative structural arrangement—that is, the establishment of hybrid
high schools—to be able to compete with the secular faction for elite func-
tions (Hasenfeld and Gidron 2005). Therefore, we expect that the motiva-1841
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Alltion of the religious faction to blend religious and cosmopolitan identities as
a response to globalization will be more pronounced when local polariza-
tion/ideological contention in the district is high.
HYPOTHESIS 5.—The positive impact of globalization on the district-level
founding rate of hybrid high schools (Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools)
increases with religious-secular polarization in a local community.DATA AND METHODS
Data
The data set covers the period from 1985 to 2007 for 81 districts in Turkey.
We counted the annual number of Anatolian, Imam Hatip, and Anatolian
Imam Hatip high schools in Turkey at the district level. We start our anal-
ysis with the foundation of the ﬁrst Anatolian Imam Hatip school in 1985
and end our analysis in 2007 because a new regulation in 2008 transformed
all regular high schools into Anatolian high schools.11 The data for Imam
Hatip high schools andAnatolian high schools were obtained fromNational
Education Statistics, as published by the Prime Ministry State Institute of
Statistics. The data for Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools were collected
through the high school directory and the websites of each Anatolian Imam
Hatip high school.Dependent Variable
Following the organizational ecology literature, our dependent variable is
the annual founding rate of Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools at the dis-
trict level (yearly number of new entries into the local district-level popula-
tion). Note that, given that we do not observe any exit or mortality of hybrid
Anatolian Imam Hatip high schools, our yearly founding count is in fact
a ﬁrst-difference variable of hybrid high school density at time tminus this
density at time t 2 1.Independent Variables
Depending on the speciﬁc deﬁnition of globalization, the literature empha-
sizes different ways to measure globalization and its different dimensions.
Some emphasize the economic angle (Harvey 1989; Sassen 1991), others fo-
cus on the political dimension (McGrew 1997; Held 1998), and yet others
claim that the economic and political perspectives ignore the cultural as-The curriculum of regular schools has changed, and the weight of foreign language11courses has increased.
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeypects of globalization (Ritzer 1993). Guillén (2001) provides a detailed anal-
ysis of different perspectives regarding globalization and its indicators. He
classiﬁes these indicators into economic, ﬁnancial, social/political, and bib-
liographical measures, and he argues that globalization should best be re-
garded as a multifaceted concept that cannot be captured by a single vari-
able. Therefore, in the current study, we decided to employ the KOF index
of globalization, which explicitly accounts for the multidimensional nature
of globalization.
The KOF index represents an attempt to develop a broad measure of
the extent of globalization of a country. This index has been accepted in re-
cent empirical literature as a valid measure and was ﬁrst presented in 2002,
covering 123 countries and including 23 variables (Dreher 2006). The index
includes economic, political, and social dimensions of globalization. Each
of these three dimensions is further divided into subdimensions. Economic
globalization of a country is described by actual economic ﬂows (trade, for-
eign direct investment, portfolio investment, and income payments to for-
eign nationals, eachmeasuredas apercentage ofGDP) and the absence of re-
strictions (hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international
trade, and capital account restrictions). Political globalization is measured
with the number of foreign embassies, memberships of international orga-
nizations, and participation in the UN Security Council missions. Social
globalization covers items such as international tourism, number of inter-
net hosts and users, as well as the number of McDonald’s restaurants and
IKEA shops (per capita). The annually updated KOF index measures glob-
alization on a scale from 1 to 100, with higher numbers indicating more
globalization. The data were obtained from the website of the Swiss Eco-
nomic Institute.
A number of studies employ the KOF index of globalization. Bergh and
Nilsson (2010) examine the relationship between the KOF index of global-
ization and income inequality by using panel data covering about 80 coun-
tries for theperiod1970–2005.Chang,Lee,andHsieh (2011)analyzethe long-
run relationship between real output and the KOF index of globalization by
employing annual data of Group of 7 countries from 1970 to 2006. Potrafke
(2010) investigates the inﬂuence of globalization on a variety of aspects of la-
bormarket deregulation by taking theKOF index as a proxy of globalization
for 20OECDcountries in the 1982–2003period.Usingpanel dataof 39 coun-
tries over the period 1979–2007, Chang and Lee (2012) estimate the impact
of the KOF index of globalization on the development and convergence of
international life insurance markets. The aim of Pekarskiene and Susniene
(2011) is to assess the (changes in the) level of globalization in theBaltic coun-
tries using the KOF globalization index.
Asa furthervalidity check,wecollecteddata regarding thenumberofnon-
proﬁt international organizations that have headquarters in Turkey, which1843
This content downloaded from 132.239.001.231 on May 30, 2017 17:47:59 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
American Journal of Sociology
Allis a well-known alternative measure of globalization (Guillén 2001). These
organizations can be classiﬁed as nongovernmental organizations, intergov-
ernmental organizations, and international nongovernmental organizations.
All these organizational actors play their role in global politics and are con-
sidered as an important indicator of globalization. The increase in the num-
ber of international organizations constitutes an institution-building pro-
cess, reﬂecting the relative power of international and global political actors
(Chase-Dunn 1999). Hence, the number of international organizations in a
country is an indicator of this country’s degree of integration into the global
world. We collected these data from the online database of The Yearbook
of International Organizations, which is published by the Union of Interna-
tional Associations.12 The correlations between this alternative globalization
measure, on the one hand, and the overall KOF globalization index and its
subdimensions (economic, political, and social), on the other hand, are very
high: .98, .96, .94, and .91, respectively.
As a second robustness check, we compare Turkish economic growth (in
GDP per capita) with globalization (through the KOF index and its three
dimensions) over time. Recall that ﬁgure 1 reveals a strong increase in all
KOF globalization indices until 1994, after which growth seem to taper off.
Figure 4 provides Turkish GDP per capita, indicating a different pattern:
GDP per capita is increasing for the whole observation period and even ac-
celerates after 2000. This suggests that economic growth follows the global-
ization trend and that economic development and globalization (as mea-
sured by the KOF index) are different measures.
We employ variables at the local level in order to analyze the character-
istics that moderate the impact of globalization. To explore hypothesis 2, we
include the interaction of the KOF globalization index and the percentage
of votes that the most religious parties received at the district level in par-
liamentary elections (variable label traditional Islamic votes), with which
we capture ideological movements that oppose globalization.13 The political
parties are classiﬁed on a secular/religious scale, ranging from 1 (the most
secular) to 10 (the most religious). This scaling was done by the ﬁrst author
(of Turkish nationality) and was cross-checked by Turkish political scien-
tists (table A1 in the appendix lists all parties that ever participated in elec-
tions during our study period and the secular/religious score attached to
each party).1412 Note that this variable does not cover as much information as the KOF globalization
index.
13 The election outcomes at time t were used to ﬁll in the subsequent years without par-
liamentary elections. Ourmeasurewas updated each time an election occurred. The same
procedure was used for the ideological polarization variable described below.
14 The most religious parties are the ones that score 10 on the secular/religious scale.
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in TurkeyTo test hypothesis 3, we include the interaction terms of the density of
Imam Hatip and Anatolian high schools with the globalization index, as
Imam Hatip and Anatolian high schools are the parent forms of the hybrid
Anatolian ImamHatip high schools. That is, as both parent forms are com-
bined in the hybrid high school form,we add a three-way interaction of both
parent form densitieswith the globalization index (next to all two-way prod-
uct terms).
The independent variable key to hypothesis 4 is the interaction of theKOF
globalization index and the growth of the number of employers at the district
level, which is our proxy for the proglobalization economic incentives as-
sociatedwith a district’s entrepreneurial community.We include the growth
of the number of employers at the district level as our measure of local eco-
nomic incentives. This variable is obtained from the National Education
Statistics, as published annually by the PrimeMinistry State Institute of Sta-
tistics.
Regarding hypothesis 5, we add the interaction of the KOF globalization
index and a polarization measure. We use the polarization index proposed
by Esteban and Ray (1994) in order to measure the secular-religious polar-
ization of local communities at the district level (variable label ideological
polarization). This polarization index is based on the Gini coefﬁcient that
takes into account both the size of the subgroups and the distance between
the polarized groups:15FIG. 4.—GDP per capita in Turkey (in U.S. dollars), 1985–200715 The measurement of the distance between groups depends on the context. In our case,
the distance between the polarized groups refers to the distance in terms of secular-
religious orientation of the community at the district level.
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in which k is the scaling factor, p denotes the size of the groups, jyi 2 yjj
gives the distance between groups i and j, and a parameterizes the degree
of polarization sensitivity that takes a value between zero and 1.6 (Esteban
and Ray 1994). This measure captures the intuition that polarization is high
when there is a large distance between a small number of groups of signif-
icant size.Wemeasure the size of the groups by using the proportional num-
ber of votes that political parties received in parliamentary elections at the
district level. The distance between the polarized groups is measured by
means of the classiﬁcation of political parties ranging from 1 (most secular)
to 10 (most religious), mentioned above. We set k5 1 and a5 0.8.16 Hence,
we follow most researchers by giving a balanced weight to the size of and
thedistancebetween the subgroups.Weranrobustnessanalyseswitha50.4
and a5 1.2, which produced a pattern of ﬁndings similar to what we report
below (available on request).Control Variables
We control for carrying capacity by including the percentage of government
expenditures devoted to education at the country level, as well as national
GDP growth and the logarithm of the population size at the district level.17
We added a dummy variable to control for the years following a territorial
change of a few districts (one for the years after the change and zero other-
wise). For the different ofﬁcial regions in Turkey (i.e., the Aegean, Black
Sea, Central Anatolian, Eastern Anatolian, Marmara, Mediterranean, and
Southeastern Anatolian regions), we introduce dummies that take a value
of one if the district is in that region and zero otherwise. At the district level,
we control for the density of previously founded hybrid high schools and the
densities of the parent high schools forms (Anatolian and ImamHatip high
schools). Finally, regular high school density is added to control for the gen-
eral expansion of the high school system in Turkey. We take the one-year
lagged values of all variables (except for the dummy variables and the two
variables based on election outcomes, i.e., traditional Islamic votes and ideo-
logical polarization, as the latter two are constant between election periodsSince k is a multiplicative constant, it does not have any qualitative effect on the results
steban and Ray 1994).
In further robustness analyses, to be discussed below, we added real GDP per capita as
control variable (available on request).16
(E
17
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeyso that an additional one-year lag is not informative) in order to avoid si-
multaneity.Model Speciﬁcation
The dependent variable is a count of the yearly number of newly established
hybrid schools in the district. The distribution of count variables is typically
highly skewed to the right with many observations that are zero or close to
zero, all values being nonnegative. As it is preferable to usemethods that are
consistent with the underlying process that generates the founding events
observed as nonnegative aggregate counts, it is recommended in the litera-
ture to use Poisson regression to analyze founding rates (Hannan and Free-
man1987,1989;BarronandHannan1991;Carroll andHannan2000).How-
ever, in the case of overdispersion (i.e., the variance of the count is larger
than the expectedmean), Poisson regression underestimates the coefﬁcients’
standard errors, leading to inﬂation of signiﬁcance levels (McCullagh and
Nelder 1989; Wezel 2005). Then, negative binominal regression should be
applied, which adds a stochastic error component, following a gamma dis-
tribution, to the model (Barron and Hannan 1991; Cattani, Pennings, and
Wezel 2003). Thismethod has become the standard in organizational sociol-
ogy toanalyzeaggregate foundingdataof thekindwecollected inourproject
(see Carroll and Hannan 2000).
Following Baron, Hannan, and Burton (2001), we use Liang and Zeger’s
(1986) method of generalized estimating equations (GEE), which generalizes
quasi likelihood estimation to the panel data context. GEE is a very ﬂexible
approach that allows one to control for many different forms of correlated
error terms, including serial autocorrelation, by using an empirical variance
estimator (Barron and Hannan 1991; Baron et al. 2001; Ballinger 2004). As
recommended byBarron andHannan (1991) in the context of the analysis of
longitudinal founding rates, we assume a ﬁrst-order autocorrelation struc-
ture to control for (potentially remaining) serial autocorrelation among error
terms. GEE also allows us to account for the likelihood of nonconstant var-
iance for different values of the dependent variable due to clustering of ob-
servations within the district by using theHuber-White Sandwich estimator
to estimate the standard errors (i.e., robust standard errors for clustering of
observations in the district). Allmodels are estimated using theXTGEErou-
tine of version 10.0 of Stata.
A few other estimation-related issues are worth mentioning. First, we
checked for nonstationarity of our dependent variable, as this might lead
to spurious relationships. Figure 5 plots the number of foundings of hybrid
high schools over time. Visual inspection suggests that this time series is
not trended and, thus, stationary. Given that there are no exit events in1847
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Allthe period under study, the founding count is, in fact, a ﬁrst-difference var-
iable of hybrid school density at time tminus t2 1. It is well established that
even nonstationary series generally become stationary after taking the ﬁrst
difference. A Fisher type unit root test for unbalanced panel data formally
reveals that we can reject the null hypothesis that all district-level time se-
ries are nonstationary against the alternative hypothesis that at least one se-
ries in our panel is stationary.18 We continued with Dickey-Fuller unit root
tests for each district separately. Our results indicate that the series of al-
most all districts (except for two) are stationary as the null hypothesis of a
unit root has to be rejected.19 Taking all this together, we conclude that
nonstationarity of our major dependent variable does not represent a seri-
ous threat to the statistical inferences made in the article.
Second, we ran conditional ﬁxed-effects negative binomial regressions
(availableonrequest).Ofcourse,bydoingso,weﬁlterout thebetween-district
variation that is essential from the perspective of our theoretical logic, which
stresses the importance of geographical heterogeneity in explaining whether
and how local communities adjust to globalization. An additional drawback
of ﬁxed effects in this setting is that we lose the observations of the few dis-
tricts that never experienced a founding event (i.e., 58 district-year obser-
vations). However, notwithstanding this removal of theoretically relevant
cross-district heterogeneity, which comes with drops in signiﬁcance levels,Note that we have 81 panels (districts). For 67 panels, we have data points for the
hole period under study (23 observations); for the remaining 14 districts, we have be-
een nine and 19 observations because these 14 districts were established only after
985 (i.e., in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s). So our panel is unbalanced.
Note that most of the standard unit root tests (such as Dickey-Fuller) have low power.
o in small samples per district, one may easily end upwith type II errors of accepting the
ull hypothesis of a unit root while it is actually false (see Hamilton 1994).18
w
tw
1
19
S
nFIG. 5.—Foundings of hybrid schools at the level of Turkey, 1985–20071848
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeythe estimates are highly sign consistent, which offers further support for the
robustness of our ﬁndings.FINDINGS
Descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations are reported in table 1. Ta-
ble 2 provides ourGEEnegative binomial regression estimates of the found-
ing rate of hybrid high schools at the district level.
We ﬁrst focus on the effects of globalization and the control variables.
Model 1 reveals that the main effect of globalization is signiﬁcantly positive
(B5 .10; P < .001), providing support for hypothesis 1 predicting that glob-
alization spurs the founding rate of hybrid high schools. In addition, na-
tional GDP growth and percentage of educational expenditures have a pos-
itive impact on hybrid high school founding. Moreover, Marmara being
the omitted region, we observe that the hybrid high school founding rate is
lower in eastern, southeastern, and central Anatolian regions. At the district
level, district population and the most religious votes have a positive effect,
whereas secular-religious polarization has a negative impact on the emer-
gence of hybrid high schools.20 Density of regular high schools does not have
any signiﬁcant effect. The model 1 estimates further suggest that the densi-
ties of Imam Hatip and Anatolian high schools both have a positive inﬂu-
ence on the emergence of hybrid high schools (B5 .14 and B5 .06, respec-
tively; for both estimates, P < .001), suggesting positive spillover effects of
the parent templates.
A perhaps counterintuitive ﬁnding is the signiﬁcantly negative sign of
lagged hybrid school density. After all, the increase in the number of hybrid
high schools in a district could have a legitimation effect, predicting a pos-
itive sign. What may explain our negative coefﬁcient is a carrying capacity
effect. That is, in a district with a certain population size, there is a natural
limit to thedemandforacertainhighschool type,whichputsanupperbound-
ary to the number of high schools of that type that can be viably established
in a district. To check for this interpretation, we ran the models without the
densities of other high school types: the results reported in the article do not
change (including the sign of the lagged density of hybrid high schools; the
results are available on request). In addition, we ran the same models by20 The ﬁnding that the traditional Islamic votes and ideological polarization have a pos-
itive and negative main effect, respectively, on the founding rate of hybrid schools might
seem surprising at ﬁrst glance. However, note that in subsequent models we show that
these variables signiﬁcantly interact with globalization, making the interpretation of
main effects not verymeaningful. On amore substantive level, the overall pattern of ﬁnd-
ings reported below suggests that the impact of globalization on hybrid school foundings
is very strong even in communities that might resist and that the local context mainly at-
tenuates the overwhelming force of globalization.
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeyreplacing the dependent variable (founding rate of hybrid high schools) with
the founding rate of Imam Hatip high schools and Anatolian high schools,
onebyone,with andwithout thedensity of the other high school types (avail-
able on request). We found negative (and signiﬁcant) coefﬁcients for the
lagged densities of ImamHatip and Anatolian high schools, respectively, in
all these supplementary analyses. These ﬁndings offer further support for
our carrying capacity explanation of the negative sign of the coefﬁcient of
the lagged density of hybrid high schools.
In model 2, we see that the proportion of the most religious votes (tradi-
tional Islamic votes) attenuates the impact of globalization on the hybrid
high school founding rate (B52.002; P < .05).21 Strong support for a tradi-
tional interpretation of Islam apparently hampers the local community from
adapting to global norms because of a lack of resonance between the global
and the local, a ﬁnding that is in line with hypothesis 2.
In model 3, we report the three-way interaction of the KOF globalization
index and the densities of ImamHatip andAnatolian high schools to test for
hypothesis 3’s prediction that the joint presence of both parent forms mod-
erates the impact of globalization by providing the institutional repertoire
for hybrid high school formation. The two-way interactions of both densi-
ties with globalization separately are negative, but the three-way interac-
tion is signiﬁcantly positive as expected (B5 .003; P < .01). This pattern of
ﬁndings underscores that the positive impact of globalization on hybrid high
school foundings increases when both types of parent high schools are prev-
alent in the district.
In model 4, we ﬁnd support for hypothesis 4. The effect of globalization
on hybrid high school formation increases with the growth in the number
of employers in a local district (B5 .01; P < .05). This ﬁnding suggests that
a strong entrepreneurial climate in a district provides the economic incen-
tives to adapt to global norms, values, and practices by blending the local
with the global. Finally, the estimates of model 5 offer evidence for hypoth-
esis 5, showing a signiﬁcantly positive interaction coefﬁcient between the
KOF globalization index and ideological polarization (B 5 .21; P < .001).
Secular-religious polarization acts as a mobilizing force for rival ideologies,
triggering the ideological incentives for local adaptation when globalization
increases.
To further explore our argument, we performed a post hoc analysis by
estimating model 6, which includes the interaction between religious votes
(hypothesis 2), on the one hand, and the growth of the number of employers21 Note that, for the traditional Islamic votes variable, we included only the political par-
ties that receive a score of 10 on the religiosity scale. As a robustness check, we also added
the political parties that score 8 and 9 on this scale. The results remain the same (available
on request).
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All(hypothesis 4), on the other. The signiﬁcantly positive estimate supports the
underlying argument that a larger Islamic faction promotes alternative mo-
dernities (Robertson and Khonder 1998), particularly in a community that
features a strong local entrepreneurial culture (B 5 .004; P < .001).Robustness Analyses
In our main analyses reported in this article, we decided against including
(lagged) GDP per capita because of the high correlation of this control var-
iablewith our (lagged)KOFglobalization index (.87), which causes potential
problems due tomulticollinearity. It iswell known that this inﬂates standard
errors of estimates, reducing t-statistics and signiﬁcance levels. However, to
disentangle the effect of these variables,we comparedmodelswithbothvari-
ablesenteredseparatelyandsimultaneously (resultsareavailableonrequest).
BothGDP per capita and the KOF globalization index are signiﬁcantly pos-
itively related to the founding rate of hybrid high schools when entered sep-
arately in the regression equation. However, when entered simultaneously,
the estimate of GDP per capita becomes insigniﬁcant, even with a negative
sign, whereas the effect of the KOF index is not affected compared to the es-
timate reported in model 1 of table 2 (i.e., B 5 .11; P < .001). This compar-
ative analysis suggests that the emergence of hybrid high schools is indeed
drivenby globalization, andnot by the steadygrowth ofGDPper capita dur-
ing our observationwindow, notwithstanding the fact that both are strongly
relatedbecause globalizationhashadahuge impact on subsequent economic
growth in Turkey (see also the comparison between both time series in ﬁgs. 1
and 4 discussed above).22
Second, we ran an analysis with the number of nonproﬁt international or-
ganizations (IOs) that have headquarters in Turkey as an alternative mea-
sure of globalization, replacing the (lagged) KOF globalization index with
the (lagged) number of IOs headquartered in Turkey (results are available
on request). All ﬁndings turn out to be very robust, which is hardly surpris-
ing given the high correlation between the alternative IO measure and the
KOF globalization index (see above). This additional analysis provides fur-
ther support for both the validity of the KOF globalization index and the
robustness of our results.
Third and ﬁnally, we ran separate analyses for the economic, political,
and social dimensions of the KOF globalization index. The results are sum-22 To be on the safe side, we also reestimated all interaction effects with the KOF glob-
alization index now including GDP per capita as a control variable. This does not qual-
itatively change the ﬁndings reported in table 2. Only the signiﬁcance level of the inter-
action effect of KOF globalization index employer number growth slightly drops to the
10% level (results available on request).
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeymarized in table 3 (full results are available on request), reporting only the
relevant estimates regarding KOF’s three dimensions.
For the economic globalization index, we ﬁnd support for all hypotheses
except hypothesis 4; for the political globalization index, we observe only
evidence in favor of hypotheses 1 and 3; and for the social globalization in-
dex, all hypotheses are supported. Note, however, that the signs of all inter-
action estimates are the same. We further discuss this set of additional ﬁnd-
ings in the concluding section.DISCUSSION
In this article, we analyze the impact of globalization on the emergence of
hybrid organizational forms, ﬁnding support for a positive main effect. We
propose that the impact of globalization depends on three local characteris-
tics: the potentialmisﬁt between global and local ideas, values, andpractices
(local resistance); the presence of institutional repertoire to blend into hybrid
organizational forms (local templates); and the motivation of the local com-
munity to adapt to global ideas, values, and practices (local incentives). We
test our hypotheses in the setting of Islamic education in Turkey between
1985 and 2007. In this period, Turkey experienced a growing impact of glob-
alization in combination with the rise of an Islamic movement, with large
variation across the country. This setting is highly appropriate for our pur-
poses, with clear forces of globalization and localization operating next to
one another.
Regarding the effect of local resistance, our evidence suggests that in the
most religious, traditional local communities, the impact of globalization on
hybrid high school formation is attenuated. The more local people vote on
themost religiousparties, the less likely localhighschoolsareestablished that
blend cosmopolitan and religious norms, values, and practices into a hybrid
form in response to increasing globalization. Then globalization presents a
threat to local traditions, aswesternization clasheswith the local,which trig-
gers strong resistance among the large traditionalist fraction of the commu-
nity against the globalmodel of education. This in turn hampers thewilling-
ness of the local community to recombine global and traditional educational
templates into a hybrid school form. Such communities are less susceptible
to adapting to global boundary-blurring forces, which often demarcates tra-
ditional boundaries between the global and the local more sharply (Marquis
and Batillana 2009).
As far as the role of local templates is concerned, we ﬁnd that the found-
ing rate of the hybrid high school form increases with the number of parent
high school forms, namely, Anatolian and Imam Hatip high schools. As a
consequence of the experience of the local community with different organi-
zational parent forms and the legitimacy that spills over from these parent1855
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeytemplates to their combination in hybrid forms, the establishment of Anato-
lian ImamHatip high schools is facilitated. The presence of parent forms in
a local community together with increases in globalization, therefore, spur
hybrid high school founding. This underscores the observation that “think-
able” alternative templates that emerge in response to societal change are of-
ten building on existing institutions (Haveman and Rao 2006; Schneiberg
and Clemens 2006).
Relating to local incentives, weﬁnd that the impact of globalization on the
founding rate of hybrid high schools increases with the growth in the num-
ber of employers in a local district, as well as with secular-religious polariza-
tion. This provides evidence for our claim that both economic and ideolog-
ical incentives trigger local communities to respond to forces of globalization
by establishing hybrid organizational forms that blend the global with the
local. That is, a strong local entrepreneurial culture that resonates with eco-
nomic globalization stimulates adaptation tobeneﬁt economically fromglob-
alization. Local ideological polarization is another mobilizing force as this
intensiﬁes direct ideological competition among different community frac-
tions. Because of globalization, cosmopolitan education based on scientiﬁc,
rational principles gained importance all over the world.23 In such circum-
stances, more traditionalmembers of a community are incentivized to adjust
to the Western model of education to keep up with the secular fraction in a
globalizingworld.Oneway is to insert key elements of the cosmopolitan tem-
plate of education in Islamic education without sacriﬁcing one’s religious
identity.
In post hoc analyses, we further explored the underlying mechanism by
estimating the interaction between the most religious votes and growth in
thenumberof employers.Although theproportionof themost religiousvotes
has a negative moderating effect on the hybrid high school founding rate,
we ﬁnd that such local communities do adapt to the global world when the
community has a strong local entrepreneurship culture. One interpretation
is that adaptation is then instrumental for the traditional religious commu-
nity in the sense that the local religious population is motivated to blend the
global with the local in order to gain from this economically without sacri-
ﬁcing too much their local identity. A hybrid organizational form such as
the Anatolian Imam Hatip high school serves this purpose by merging key
elements of cosmopolitan education into an otherwise Islamic teaching tra-
dition.
We ran a series of additional analyses to explore the robustness of our
ﬁndings. Indeed, our results survive changes in the estimation method, the23 Following Meyer (2000), we use “rationalism” to refer to the convergence of educa-
tional templates based on science. According toMeyer and his colleagues, both organiza-
tions and actors are subject to standardizing rationalization because of globalization that
arises from a scientiﬁc analysis of nature as universal and lawful.
1857
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Allset of control variables, or the measure of globalization. Substantively, the
robustness analyses regarding the different dimensions of globalization—
economic, political, and social—are particularly interesting. These analyses
reveal that economic and, particularly, social globalization is important to
explain the emergence of hybrid high school forms, whereas political glob-
alization is not. Indeed, this ﬁnding is in line with our result that economic
and ideological incentives provide the motivation to adapt to the global
while preserving the local. Apparently, political globalization per se does
not sufﬁce to affect people’smotivation, perhaps because such globalization
does not seriously affect the local communities’ norms and values. This un-
derscores that globalization is also an ideology (Guillén 2001), which takes
time to become part of the cultural mind-set of local communities. As a re-
sult, it is unsurprising that the social dimension of globalization reveals the
largest effects on the emergence of hybrid high schools in Turkey.
Post hoc,we also estimatedmodels to further explore the effect of ourmain
variables on the founding rate of Anatolian and Imam Hatip high schools
(results are available on request). These analyses reveal that globalization
has a signiﬁcantly positive impact on the founding ofAnatolian high schools,
as these schools are the carriers of cosmopolitan values and norms ever since
their foundation. However, globalization has a signiﬁcantly negative effect
on the founding of ImamHatip high schools, as they are out of tune with the
increasing inﬂuence of globalization. Conversely, a larger share of the most
religious votes has a negativemain impact on the founding rate of Anatolian
high schools but stimulates the founding rate of Imam Hatip high schools.
Interestingly, polarization reduces the founding rate of Imam Hatip high
schools (but not that of theAnatolian schools). Overall, the results from these
supplementary analyses reﬂect ourmainﬁndings regardingAnatolian Imam
Hatip high schools. The pattern of ﬁndings suggests that two trends domi-
nate in Turkey. On the one hand, a globalization trend spurs cosmopolitan
education, boosting Anatolian high school founding; on the other hand, lo-
cal religious traditions oppose this trend, favoring Imam Hatip high school
founding (and more so when globalization pressures increase). Only when
local polarization is high do local communities (with the most religious vot-
ers) “adjust” to increasing globalization by the establishment of hybrid An-
atolian Imam Hatip high schools.
In this study,we built on institutional and glocalization theories and com-
bined those with insights from organizational ecology in order to under-
stand the impact of globalization on the emergence and expansion of hybrid
organizational forms. Hence, our article contributes to the literature in sev-
eral ways. First, until recently, most institutional theory has mainly focused
on how higher-order institutional pressures affect lower-level mimetic be-
havior leading to ﬁeld-level convergence (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006).
Communities and organizations are regarded as relatively passive recipients1858
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in Turkeyof top-down institutional pressures (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), giving a
somewhat “deterministic” ﬂavor to institutional theory (Marquis and Batil-
lana 2009). Our approach underscores the important role of agency and con-
testation in whether and how actors are willing to adjust to these pressures.
How institutional pressures, such as globalization processes, unfold depends
on place-bound features and therefore requires a systematic study of the het-
erogeneity among communities and their organizations. The bottom line is
that actors have a range of responses available when facing institutional
pressure (see also Oliver 1991). Building on glocalization theory, we show
that local cultures may critically adapt or resist global phenomena and that
the creation of localities is a standard component of globalization (Robertson
and Khonder 1998). In order to understand when, where, and why hybrid
organizational forms emerge as a reaction to globalization, it is important to
analyze the local characteristics that moderate the impact of globalization.
Our study is one of the ﬁrst systematic, comparative empirical studies ana-
lyzing the impact of this interplay on the emergence of hybrid organizational
forms, focusing on the role of local resistance, local templates, and local in-
centives.
The usefulness of this comparative institutional approach is witnessed by
the fact that it allows us to reconcile the many conﬂicting outcomes of glob-
alization that have been discussed in the literature, ranging from conver-
gence via hybridization to divergence. Indeed, our ﬁndings suggest that the
speciﬁc outcomeof globalizationdepends on local conditions in a predictable
way. We also show that different versions of modernity might emerge de-
pending on the speciﬁc interplay between the global and the local. Moder-
nity is therefore not inherently globalizing, as Giddens (1990) argued. Glob-
alization is an ideology subject to contestation (Guillén 2001). What Western
people deﬁne as modernity is not what other movements such as Islam and
Marxism claim (Robertson 1992; Guillén 2001). Out of contestation, alter-
native models emerge, fueling pluralistic identities that compete for domi-
nance. As Geertz (1998, p. 107; cited by Guillén 2001) observes, the world
“is growing both more global and more divided, more thoroughly intercon-
nected and intricately partitioned at the same time.”
In the context of our study, the diffusion of the hybrid high school form
that educates young people to become world citizens who compete for elite
functions illustrates that Islam is becoming a global force itself, deﬁning
a competing logic in parallel with Western modernity. This is also demon-
strated by the steady growth of the Gülen movement, a transnational reli-
gious and social force that has been described as the world’s most global
movement (Göle 2000; Kuru 2003). This movement, led by the Turkish
Muslim thinker FethullahGülen, is active in educationwith schools inmore
than 140 countries and also invests in media, ﬁnance, and for-proﬁt health
clinics. The education offered by the Gülen movement is similar to that of1859
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Allthe Turkish hybrid high schools, blending global rationalized principles of
education with Islam. The purpose is to form a new synthesis between sci-
ence and religion, reason and revelation, and progress and conservatism in-
spired by Islam (Kuru 2003) and to encourage practicing Muslims to be ac-
tive participants in a globalizing world. Unsurprisingly, this movement, in
turn, is contested inWestern nation-states, such as in the United States and
the Netherlands, questioning the good intentions of the movement.
Our study also contributes to organizational ecology, which has a partic-
ular interest in explaining where andwhy new organizational forms emerge
to understand the dynamics of organizational diversity (McKendrick et al.
2003; Boone and Özcan 2014; Bogaert et al. 2016). This literature further
recognizes that organizations are important carriers of ideology that fuel
contestation, social change, and adaptation (Barnett and Woywode 2004;
Simons and Ingram 2004; Sine and Lee 2009). For instance, cooperative or-
ganizations often emerge in response to corporations out of anticorporate
sentiments in order to defend the “commonwealth” logic against the domi-
nant “mass market” logic (Schneiberg et al. 2008; Boone and Özcan 2014).
In a similar vein, the educational system responds to globalization by build-
ing hybrid schools that serve the purpose of deﬁning and diffusing an al-
ternative form of Islamic modernism. Clearly, organizations are important
vehicles of institutional change. Therefore, the study of how organizational
dynamics coevolve with institutions is of great importance, although this is-
sue received insufﬁcient attention in prior work (Haveman and Rao 2006).
Our particular focus on explaining the emergence of hybrid organiza-
tional forms implies an additional contribution. Because hybrid organiza-
tional forms build on existing institutional templates, they represent insti-
tutional carriers that allow for incremental institutional change, as opposed
to discontinuous change, where one logic is discarded and replaced (Have-
man and Rao 2006). Despite their importance, little attention has been paid
to the processes that lead to the emergence of hybrid forms and under which
conditions boundaries dissolve to produce hybridity (Lamont and Molnar
2002). In this article, we analyze the role of globalization on institutional
change that leads to the mixing of blueprints belonging to opposing catego-
ries, which is a widely neglected topic in the literature (Rao et al. 2005). This
is an important omission, as literature shows that hybrid forms meet sharp
punishment, particularly if the category codes are oppositional or involve
moral imperatives (Kovács and Hannan 2010). Our study suggests, how-
ever, that if the community has a lot at stake and therefore has a strong
motivation for blending oppositional categories, then hybrid forms might
emerge without getting penalized. Thus, to understand the emergence of hy-
brids, it is essential to take into account the underlying dynamics that trigger
the adaptation process, such as the strong ideological polarization in Turkey.1860
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Emergence of Hybrid Islamic Schools in TurkeyFinally, our study contributes to the extensive research program on the
worldwide diffusion of education systemsbyMeyer et al. (1997, 2010).These
scholars argue and report empirical evidence that the expansion of rational-
ized modernity leads to enormous convergence in educational systems all
over the world. Although the convergence process is well reﬂected in the lit-
erature (Anderson-Levitt 2003), research has paid less attention to the vari-
ation across different societies and the reasons behind this variation. In our
study, we focused on a more ﬁne-grained community-level analysis, show-
ing that variation indeed matters. Although this seems to undermine the
education-system convergence thesis, it is important to stress that Meyer and
Hannan (1979) claimed that isomorphism relates to structural similarity (so-
called similarities of form), however decoupled from purpose and intentions
(see alsoGuillén 2001). Interestingly, this seems toﬁtwith theAnatolian Imam
Hatip high schools we studied: the scientiﬁc/rational template is copied while
the local religious-inspiredvaluesdeﬁningpurposeand intentionsare retained.
Our study is not without limitations, which provide opportunities for fur-
ther research.Here,wewould like tomention three suchopportunities. First,
our data offer the opportunity formore detailed studies of the underlying dy-
namics of district-level movements and countermovements in interaction
with country-level globalization. For instance, we may examine the differ-
ences in the speed of adjustment (or the strength of resistance) across differ-
ent Turkish districts in response to forces of globalization. Another example
is a study of reversed causalities. In our speciﬁcation, we took care of this by
lagging our key independent variables, but this does not exclude an impact
of district-level dynamics on globalization: the founding of cosmopolitan or
hybrid high schools may foster forces that may contribute to globalization.
Second, there is the question as to the extent to which our results are gen-
eralizable to other settings.Given that globalization is averybroad topic and
that there are many different studies in different ﬁelds, this question is difﬁ-
cult to answer. However, we see that similar hybrid organizational forms
emerge as a consequence of globalization in other domains of society, an ex-
ample being Islamic banks (Segrado 2005). Islamic banks operate according
to the principles of Islamic law. Yet, at the same time, the products and ser-
vices provided by Islamic banks are similar to the ones offered by conven-
tional banks. Islamic banks are hybrids in the sense of combining modern
methods of business and ﬁnance with Islamic laws concerning economics.
Another example is the emergence of the integrated Islamic high schools
in Indonesia, also in the 1980s (Hasan 2009). These schools combine Islamic
education with a modern curriculum, too, and are preferred by the elite
class. The reasons behind the emergence of these hybrid school forms can
probably be explained by local characteristics similar to the ones in Turkey,
such as the growing entrepreneurial class in Indonesia. And another driver1861
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Allmay well be the ideological polarization within the different sects of the
Muslim population and between different religions (Hasan 2009).
Third, of similar interest would be to study contexts in which hybrid or-
ganizational forms fail to emerge. Only then can we really understand the
boundary conditions of our theory. The examples above suggest that the
emergence of hybrid organizational forms follows from the presence of both
segregating and blending forces, particularly for the emergence of hybrid
forms that carry rival ideologies. In the Muslim world, Turkey might be a
special case because of the powerful secular movement, as initiated by Ata-
turk in the early 20th century. Perhaps such a national secular policy is a pre-
condition for embracing cosmopolitan and globalized patterns. For that rea-
son, the emergence of hybrid schools in a country like Iran is not very likely
because of the absence of strong blending forces. In future work, we hope to
further develop the comparative perspective implied by the theory proposed
in the current study.APPENDIX
TABLE A1
Political Parties and Score on the Secular-Religious Scale (1 to 10)
Political Parties
Secular/
Religious
Scale
Changing Turkey Party (Degisen Turkiye Partisi): 1998–2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Communist Party of Turkey (Turkiye Komunist Partisi): 2001– . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti): 1985– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Democratic Party (Demokratik Parti): 1970–80 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Democratic Turkey Party (Demokrat Turkiye Partisi): 1997–2005 . . . . . . . . . 7
Democracy and Peace Party (Demokrasi ve Baris Partisi): 1996–2002 . . . . . . 1
Felicity Party (Saadet Partisi): 2001– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Great Union Party (Buyuk Birlik Partisi): 1993– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Homeland Party (Yurt Partisi): 2002– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Independent Turkey Party (Bagimsiz Turkiye Partisi): 2001– . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi): 2001– . . . . . . . 8
Labour Party (Emek Partisi): 1996– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Liberal Democratic Party (Liberal Demokrat Parti): 1995– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi): 1983– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Nation Party (Millet Partisi): 1992– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Nationalist Democracy Party (Milliyetci Demokrasi Partisi): 1983–86. . . . . . . 5
Nationalist Movement Party (Milliyetci Hareket Partisi): 1969– . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Nationalist Working Party (Milliyetci Calisma Partisi): 1983–93 . . . . . . . . . . . 9
New Democracy Movement (Yeni Demokrasi Hareketi): 1994–97 . . . . . . . . . 5
New Party (Yeni Parti): 1993–97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Freedom and Solidarity Party (Ozgurluk ve Dayanisma Partisi): 1996– . . . . . 1
Peace Party (Baris Partisi): 1996–99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
People’s Ascent Party (Halkin Yukselisi Partisi): 2005– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
People’s Democracy Party (Halkin Demokrasi Partisi): 1994–2003 . . . . . . . . . 1
People’s Party (Halkci Parti): 1983–85 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21862
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Political Parties
Secular/
Religious
Scale
Rebirth Party (Yeniden Dogus Partisi): 1992–2002. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Reformist Democracy Party (Islahatci Demokrasi Partisi): 1984–92 . . . . . . . . 8
Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi): 1923– . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyaldemokrat Halkci Parti): 1985–95 . . . 2
Socialist Government Party (Sosyalist İktidar Partisi): 1993–2001 . . . . . . . . . . 1
Socialist Party (Sosyalist Parti): 1988–92 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
True Path Party (Dogru Yol Partisi): 1983– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi): 1997–2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi): 1983–98 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Worker’s Party (Isci Partisi): 1992– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Young Party (Genc Parti): 2002– . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5This content downloaded from 132.239.001.231 on May 30, 2017 17:
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